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Abstract 
 The purpose of this study is to explore a network of female pro-Islamic State of Syria 
and Iraq (ISIS) supporters on Twitter. To do so, I identified twenty Twitter accounts (n=20) 
through snowball sampling, and analyzed their network comprising 5,861 vertices and 
12,034 edges. I studied the network using three social network analysis metrics—Freeman’s 
normalized betweenness centrality, average geodesic distance, and tie strength. Females in 
the sample were more influential than males, and as a result, had a greater ability to 
radicalize other females within their network. Further, I observed that it took females longer 
than expected to send information within the network, according to the Three Degrees of 
Influence Theory. Finally, I found that most ties within the network were not reciprocated. In 
line with the Strength of Weak Ties Theory, Pro-ISIS females have a unique ability to 
radicalize others to support pro-jihadist terrorism on Twitter.  I conclude that despite the long 
average geodesic distance, certain pro-ISIS females can successfully encourage other women 
to radicalize. Public safety officials, Twitter, and other researchers must respond to this 
phenomenon accordingly.  
Keywords 
Females, pro-jihadist terrorism, Islamic State of Syria and Iraq, radicalization, online radical 
milieus, social media, Twitter, Social Network Analysis 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
In November 2014, a twenty-year old woman named Asqsa Mahmood was 
reported missing by her parents in Glasgow (Fantz & Shubert, 2015; Kenez, 2014). An 
investigation revealed she left on her own accord, travelling from the United Kingdom to 
live in Syria, within territory held by the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) (Vidino & 
Hughes, 2015). According to news outlets, Mahmood’s journey from being an average 
young woman to a staunch supporter of the Islamic State (IS) began online, when she 
started to visit extremist webpages—a similar path to other females who radicalized and 
supported pro-jihadist terrorism (Kenez, 2014; Pearson, 2015).1 Mahmood resurfaced 
online, using a blog on Tumblr entitled Diary of a Muhajirat and a Twitter account, 
@ummlayth, to communicate (Kenez, 2014). Using these platforms she voiced her 
support for the IS ideology, including her desire to participate in combat (Peresin & 
Cervone, 2015).2 
In February of 2015, Shamima Begum, a teenager from the Tower Hamlets 
Borough of London, tweeted at Aqsa: “Follow me so I can DM you back” (Begum as 
cited in Stone, 2015) Shortly thereafter, Begum and her two friends, Amira Abase and 
Khadiza Sultana, were reported missing by their families (Saltman & Smith, 2015). 
                                                 
1 For example, Roshonara Choudhry radicalized by visiting webpages and viewing 
radical content on social media  (Pearson, 2015).  
2 These accounts are suspended or have been deleted.  
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Officials quickly found that the teenagers (referred to in the UK and international media 
as the Bethnal Green Girls) left their homes to travel to Syria, with the intention of living 
under IS-held territory – similar to Mahmood (ibid). They settled in Raqqa, supposedly 
living within an IS-controlled compound (Sherlock, Daunt, & Tarling, 2015).3 Abase 
continued to use Twitter, posting content ranging from anti-Assad messages to seemingly 
benign tweets about enjoying ‘takeout’ food with another female IS supporter  (Malm, 
2015; Saltman & Smith, 2015).4,5 
 The stories of Mahmood and the Bethnal Green Girls show how social media sites 
offer pro-jihadist terrorist supporters a unique opportunity to disseminate information and 
radicalize others through direct forms of communication. The utility of social media for 
these groups has been well documented by researchers, public safety organizations, and 
even infamous radical Islamic clerics (J. Berger & Morgan, 2015; Bjelopera, 2013; 
Helfstein, 2012; Huey, 2015; Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2011; Klausen, 2014; 
Weimann, 2014). In fact, social media has become an integral component of IS’s strategy 
to claim victory in the Syrian Civil War (Farwell, 2014). These sites, such as Twitter, 
allow terrorists to appeal to a broader market of online sympathizers (Sageman 2008). 
Social media is also valuable for terrorist groups as it affords females unprecedented 
opportunities to support them (Hoyle, Bradford & Frenet, 2015; Huey & Peladeau, 2016; 
                                                 
3 Raqqa, or Al-Raqqah, was established capital of the Islamic-State in 2014 (J. Berger & 
Morgan, 2015; Farooq, 2015). 
4 Recently, Sultana was killed after a Russian air strike hit the city (Dearden, 2016). 
5 i.e. Amira Abase posted a picture on her twitter account, @binttabbas, of her and 
another woman enjoying take-out food (Sherlock et al., 2015). The account is currently 
suspended. 
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Lahoud, 2014; Saltman & Smith, 2015). Researchers have begun to observe what female 
supporters, like Mahmood, do on social media platforms—that is, what they tweet about 
and how they support terrorist organizations in their own rite. For example, Huey and 
Peladeau (2016), Saltman and Smith (2015), and Hoyle et al. (2015), have documented 
the fact that female supporters of pro-jihadist terrorist groups act in a variety of ways on 
social media, ranging from discussing topics central to the organization’s mandate or 
calling for direct acts of violence. Recently, scholars such as Klausen (2014) have also 
taken a network-based approach to study this phenomenon, providing a view on the 
structure of these pro-jihadist female social media networks.   
1.1  The Current Study 
The present study contributes to the existing literature through an exploration of 
female participation within the pro-ISIS Twitter network. It employs Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) to address three research questions:  
1. How influential are pro-ISIS females, relative to their male counterparts 
(evaluated by betweenness centrality) on Twitter?  
2. What is the average geodesic distance (the number of hops between two nodes) of 
the female pro-ISIS network?  
3. How strong are the ties (the level of reciprocity) in the female pro-ISIS network 
on Twitter? 
 
I collected a non-probabilistic snowball sample of twenty Twitter accounts owned by 
female users (n=20). The network within the sample comprised 5,861 accounts and 
12,034 relationships amongst these accounts (i.e. retweets or follows between two 
individuals). From the sample, I calculated three SNA metrics – Freeman’s normalized 
betweenness centrality, average geodesic distance, and tie strength – in order to address 
the research questions. 
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This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter Two reviews the current literature on the 
topics of social media, gender, and radicalization. The chapter begins with a discussion 
regarding the utility of social media for pro-jihadist terrorist groups – specifically ISIS. I 
move on to explain how these social media platforms act as online radical milieus 
(ORMs), in which individuals can become radicalized and made into supporters of 
extremist organizations through contact with other extremists. Next, I examine the work 
of other researchers on pro-IS males’ and females’ participation on Twitter. I explain how 
the current study will use SNA to explore the sample pro-IS female network. The chapter 
concludes with an explanation of the Three Degrees of Influence (TDI) and Strength of 
Weak Ties (SWT) Theories used in the analysis section (Chapter Five) of this thesis.  
Chapter Three discusses the methodology used to analyze the sample pro-IS female 
Twitter network. It includes an overview of the data collection process, the different 
social network analysis metrics used, and the equations UCInet and NodeXL used to 
calculate the metrics. The chapter concludes with a review of the study’s ethical 
considerations, as well as limitations identified that are unique to the social network 
analysis method.   
Chapters Four and Five are the findings and discussions sections of the thesis 
respectively. In Chapter Four, I present my results in Tables 1 through 4. Chapter Five 
discusses the results of the study in accordance with the theories and literature explained 
in Chapter One. This chapter also explains the implications of the findings, addresses 
general limitations of the study, and identifies considerations for future studies on the 
topics.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Literature Review 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relevant literature on the topics of 
gender, radicalization, and Twitter. It begins with a discussion of why terrorist groups and 
their supporters use social media to communicate with each other. An examination follows 
of how social media platforms serve as online radical milieus (ORMs), or spaces in which 
pro-jihadist supporters radicalize others. Next, the chapter addresses research on Twitter 
as a radicalizing environment for pro-Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) supporters. In 
particular, it discusses research on the ways in which female supporters use Twitter and 
facilitate the radicalization of others. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how this 
thesis contributes to the field of existing literature, as well as a review of the two theories 
employed in the study: Three Degrees of Influence and Strength of Weak Ties. 
2.1 Social Media 
 With social media, terrorist organizations such as ISIS have an unprecedented 
opportunity to communicate with current and potential supporters (Conway, 2012; 
Klausen, 2014; Sageman, 2008; Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, & Jackson, 2015; Weimann, 
2010).6 Specifically, two factors have led to increased opportunities for supporters to 
connect. The first has been the internet’s widespread accessibility. Since the beginning of 
                                                 
6 While there are many active terrorist organizations in the world, this thesis strictly 
focuses on ISIS. 
6 
 
the 21st Century, billions of individuals have been using mobile phones and computers to 
connect with one another in seconds, with little cost and effort required (Sageman, 2008; 
Stevens & Neumann, 2009). The second factor is the multitude of Web 2.0 platforms, 
such as forums, chatrooms, and social media sites, which promote user-generated content 
and interaction (Conway, 2016; Sageman, 2008; Homeland Security Institute, 2009; 
Weimann, 2010).7 Of these web 2.0 platforms, social media sites are the primary online 
environments for terrorist groups and their supporters (Berger & Morgan, 2015; 
Helfstein, 2012; Huey, 2015; Institute for strategic dialogue, 2011; Klausen, 2014; 
Weimann, 2014). Social media is defined as a set of tools or infrastructure that is “used to 
produce and distribute content” (Hogan & Quan-Haase, 2010; Howard & Parks, 2012, p. 
362). Parks and Howard (2012, p.362) further explain that “the content […] takes the 
digital form of personal messages, news, ideas, and cultural products” which may be 
consumed by “people, organizations, and industries.” Many popular platforms used today 
include Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Tumblr.  
Terrorists such as Anwar al-Awlaki have explicitly voiced their preference for 
communicating with others using these platforms, encouraging men and women to 
become internet mujahedeen (Bloom, 2013; Conway, 2012; Lahoud, 2014; von Behr, 
                                                 
7 Web 2.0 is a term created by O’Reilly (2007) to describe websites created after 2001. 
These sites have different capabilities than their predecessors, such as enabling wikis or 
blog posts (ibid).  
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Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013).8,9 Awlaki pioneered the use of  the internet in jihad 
by posting sophisticated versions of propaganda on social media, including videos 
inciting violence against the United States (Bjelopera, 2013; Weimann, 2014).10 Further, 
as Lahoud (2014, p.788) explains, “several jihadi activists who carried out operations in 
the United States credited their activism to their inspiration by his online writings and 
lectures.” For instance, an investigation into Roshonara Choudhry’s online activities 
revealed that she was an avid viewer of Awlaki’s YouTube sermons (Pearson, 2015).11  
 There are a variety of reasons why jihadists such as Awlaki have preferred using 
social media. First of all, social media has increased the flow of propaganda for extremist 
groups such as ISIS (J. Berger & Morgan, 2015; Chatfield, Reddick, & Brajawidagda, 
2015; Farwell, 2014; Homeland Security Institute, 2009; Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
2011; Hoyle et al., 2015; Klausen, 2014; Liang, 2015; Weimann, 2010). Terrorist groups 
that were active prior to the advent of social media had to rely on Web 1.0 platforms and 
a small number of traditional media sources to publish propaganda (Klausen, 2014). They 
used other mechanisms such as e-magazines to spread their message. For example, Al 
Qaeda’s Inspire magazine was created to discuss a variety of topics ranging from bomb-
                                                 
8
 Awlaki was killed by an American drone strike in 2011 (Lahoud, 2014).  
9 Mujahideen is an Arabic term for “holy warrior” (Picart, 2015) 
10 It is important to note that, in the context of this thesis, jihad refers to Salafist jihad in 
which “jihadi ideologues have molded […] from a territorially oriented doctrine into a 
contemporary global military program” (Lahoud, 2014, p. 782). 
11 In 2010, Choudhry stabbed Stephen Timms, a British MP (Pearson, 2015). 
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making to praise for individuals for committing lone-wolf attacks (Conway, 2016; 
Helfstein, 2012; Holbrook, 2015; Lahoud, 2014; Picart, 2015). Today, groups such as 
ISIS still have formal media offices that disseminate propaganda, but efforts have been 
de-centralized and now members and supporters of these groups actively create their own 
propaganda (Gates & Podder, 2015; Huey & Peladeau, 2016; Klausen, 2014; Nissen, 
2015).12 Notably, the shift to social media platforms has given women opportunities to 
participate by sharing online content to influence other pro-jihadist supporters. In fact, as 
Picart (2015, p.5) explains, women are thought to be “well versed in the use of social 
media,” creating and posting content which frames jihad as “cool” (Ghajar-khosravi, 
Kwantes, Derbentseva, & Huey, 2016; Huey, 2015). 
Pro-jihadist supporters use different social media platforms for different purposes. 
Sites such as YouTube are generally reserved for disseminating visual propaganda, such 
as videos from the frontlines, speeches, and sermons, as shown in the case of Awlaki 
(Klausen, Barbieri, Reichlin-Melnick, & Zelin, 2012; Klausen, 2014; Pearson, 2015; 
Weimann, 2014).Other social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter use Web 2.0 
capabilities to the fullest, encouraging user interaction. In effect, propaganda on these 
sites becomes more engaging to potential and current supporters, making it much more 
effective at radicalizing other individuals (Helfstein, 2012; Klausen, 2014; Weimann, 
2010). On Facebook, terrorists may have official accounts and communicate with 
followers and potential recruits through posts (Weimann, 2014). Weimann (2014) 
                                                 
12 Al-Hayat is ISIS’s media outlet  responsible for publishing the Dabiq Magazine 
(McCabe, 2016). 
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compares Facebook to an email marketing list, as supporters have a virtually infinite 
number of individuals they can connect with. Despite Facebook’s popularity with pro-
jihadist supporters, Twitter is considered to be the principal online radical milieu of 
(ORM) for male and female supporters of these groups (Altman, 2015; Klausen, 2014; 
Weimann, 2014). 
2.2  Online Radical Milieus  
Researchers consider social media sites, such as Twitter, as online environments 
or milieus for their users (Conway, 2012; Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014); however, 
platforms used by extremists and their supporters are considered to be online radical 
milieus (Conway, 2012; Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2010; Pearson, 2015). A milieu is 
radical in nature when the interactions within it are characterized by violent absolutist 
views towards a particular political conflict or issue (Conway, 2012; Malthaner & 
Waldmann, 2014). For supporters of IS, Twitter acts as an ORM in which they can voice 
support for IS ideologies and help accomplish their goals (Conway, 2012; Malthaner & 
Waldmann, 2014).13 Part of ISIS’s mandate is to establish a Caliphate in the Middle East, 
and they have used the Syrian Civil War as a means of accomplishing this (Byman, 
2015). As a result, many pro-IS Twitter accounts frequently discuss the necessity of 
establishing the caliphate (Huey & Peladeau, 2016). Perhaps because nearly all of these 
pro-IS supporters on Twitter share a common view of the conflict, Twitter acts as a 
milieu where they can share “experiences, symbols, narratives, and frameworks of 
                                                 
13There are a handful of groups fighting within the Syrian Civil War; however, for the 
purpose of this thesis, I focus strictly on ISIS.  
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interpretation” (Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014, p. 983). The Tawheed is one example of a 
common symbol for ISIS supporters and is frequently a subject of posts and online 
discussions  (see Appendix 1) (Berger & Morgan, 2015). Supporters also share common 
extremist beliefs and values, such as the general view that violence is a reasonable means 
to an end (ibid). For instance, ISIS supporters may publicly call for acts of terrorism in 
order to spread their Salafist message (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Hoyle et al., 2015; Huey 
& Peladeau, 2016; Saltman & Smith, 2015).14  
ORMs are a threat to public safety because they may radicalize individuals into 
committing acts of violence or adopting pro-violent attitudes and behaviors (Conway, 
2012; Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). For the purposes 
of this thesis, radicalization is defined as:  
increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, 
radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that 
increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-
group. (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 416) 
In this sense, radicalization is not an immediate occurrence, but a process marked by 
evolving changes in opinions and actions (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). Radicalized 
supporters may begin to adopt a violent rhetoric online, praising those involved in battles 
as “fighter-heroes” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 982). On the other end of the 
spectrum, participants in the ORM may engage in more radical acts, such as joining the 
terrorist organization they support or committing lone-wolf attacks in the West in order to 
                                                 
14Salafism is a fundamentalist view of Islam which promotes violence and strict 
interpretation of the Qur’an (Cottee, 2010; Pearson, 2015). As an example, both Al 
Qaeda and ISIS are considered to be Salafist organizations (Pearson, 2015). 
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show their support for the organization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; Weimann, 
2012). In the pro-IS ORM, outcomes may include making hijra to Syria in an attempt to 
become fighters themselves (Saltman & Smith, 2015).15 
Social media sites are particularly impactful in the process of radicalization as 
they facilitate the formation of new online friendships (Bouchard & Nash, 2014; Conway, 
2012; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). These new relationships can be understood as 
examples of weak ties because they form between two unfamiliar individuals who would 
be “otherwise unconnected” with each other (Ducol, Bouchard, Davies, Ouellet, & 
Neudecker, 2016, p. 106; Kennedy & Weimann, 2011) Weak ties serve as the basis for 
pro-jihadist terrorists and supporters to integrate an individual into a radical environment 
(Kennedy & Weimann, 2011). In this sense, platforms such as Twitter act as venues to 
normalize discourse on extremist views (Huey, 2015; Koehler, 2014; Torok, 2013).16 
2.3 Twitter 
Twitter is one of the largest social media platforms, with an estimated 310 million 
monthly users (Twitter, 2016a). The platform has innovated the process of radicalization, 
as users are now able to strategically communicate with others in an effort to gain online 
support in the Syrian Conflict (J. M. Berger & Strathearn, 2013; Carter, Maher, & 
                                                 
15To make hijra means to migrate (Saltman & Smith, 2015) 
16 In this case, normalization refers to the act when “Practices become routinely 
embedded… in social contexts as the result of people working, individually and 
collectively, to enact them” (May, Mair, Finch, MacFarlane, Dowrick, Treweek, Rapley, 
Ballini, Ong, Murrary, Elwyn, Legare, Gunn, & Montori,  2009, p.2.) 
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Neumann, 2014; Chatfield et al., 2015; Klausen, 2014). Users influence others by 
communicating with tweets (posts consisting of a maximum of 140 characters), by 
retweeting others and using hashtags (Gruzd & Wellman, 2014). Additionally, account 
holders have the option of favouriting tweets (indicating they like the message), 
following other accounts, or direct messaging someone (direct messages are private and 
do not appear on profiles, unlike other features). Researchers have explained how the 
platform is extremely conducive to fostering weak ties – a key component in 
radicalization on social media, as previously established – because of the variety of ways 
in which users can connect with each other (Bouchard & Nash, 2014; Gladwell, 2010; 
Segerberg & Bennett, 2011; Takhteyev, Gruzd, & Wellman, 2012). Perhaps Twitter’s 
most important feature for ISIS supporters is the ability to hyper-link to other sites. 
Twitter acts as a “beacon for sharing short links to content dispersed across numerous 
digital platforms,” in effect uniting multiple sources of propaganda (Chatfield et al., 
2015; Klausen, 2014; Prucha & Fisher, 2013). For example, a user can tweet a message 
with Pro-IS content, while at the same time linking to a YouTube video or Tumblr post 
with visuals, combining the power of multiple social media sources and, in effect, 
reaching out to more individuals (Carter et al., 2014). According to Twitter’s (2016) user 
statistics, this feature is extremely popular with all types of users, generating one billion 
visits to other sites on a monthly basis. 
 A significant portion of the research on pro-jihadist organizations’ online 
activities examines how men participate in these networks as jihadists and pro-jihadist 
supporters (Conway, 2016; Lahoud, 2014). Researchers have observed that among the 
pro-jihadist ORMs on Twitter, there are several groups of influential men. The first 
13 
 
group, fighters, or mujahedeen, make up a significant component of the milieu (Chatfield 
et al., 2015; Hoyle et al., 2015; Klausen, 2014; Vidino & Hughes, 2015). This group 
typically comprises Western Foreign Fighters, also known as Green Birds (Carter et al., 
2015; Klausen, 2014).17 These individuals post a wide variety of content, but often use 
Twitter to discuss activities directly from the frontlines as they are occurring (Carter al., 
2015; Klausen, 2014). As Klausen (2014, p.8) explains, Green Birds play a critical role in 
influencing the pro-IS ORM, with at least three-quarters of foreign fighters’ accounts 
having a “significant impact as proselytizers for violent jihad.” Their influence derives 
from the fact that their posts allow members of the milieu to experience battles remotely, 
inspiring others to take on a more radical mindset and normalizing violence (Carter et al., 
2015; Farwell, 2014).  
The second group consists of disseminators or supporters. These users are critical 
in encouraging radicalization (Al-khateeb & Agarwal, 2015; Carter et al., 2014; Glavin, 
2015; Klausen, 2014; Nissen, 2015; Prucha & Fisher, 2013). While they do not actively 
participate on the frontlines of the war, nor do they have an official affiliation with ISIS 
(Carter et al. 2014), disseminators are considered news-brokers – a collection of 
individuals who ensure information through their respective networks (Carter et al., 2015; 
Klausen, 2014). Disseminators are particularly influential because these users ensure they 
                                                 
17 Carter et al. (2015, p. 10) define a foreign fighter as “any person who has travelled to 
Syria to join any group opposed to the Syrian government; performs combat activities; 
and lacks Syrian citizenship (or, if ethnically Syrian, is ordinarily domiciled outside of 
the country);” however, in the context of this thesis, foreign fighters refer to those who 
join ISIS.  
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engage with other accounts, unlike other pro-IS tweeters (Carter et al., 2015; Glavin, 
2015). For example, @shamiwitness is a known disseminator and one of the most 
influential pro-ISIS accounts on Twitter (Chatfield et al, 2015; al Khateeb & Agarwall, 
2015; Klausen, 2014: Carter et al., 2015).18 His influence derives from his efforts in 
tweeting at other users in an attempt to radicalize them (Chatfield et al., 2015).  
There are also official IS accounts that participate in the pro-IS milieu; however, 
these users abstain from interacting directly with other users through Twitter (Berger & 
Morgan, 2015; Carter et al. 2014; Chatfield et al. 2015; Klausen, 2014; Prucha & Fisher, 
2015). Instead, they use Twitter strictly to post updates on conquests in battle or to 
disseminate propaganda (Carter et al. 2015). For this reason, users of these accounts often 
have a close relationship with those who are fighting on the frontlines (ibid).  
2.3.1 The Umm Network 
 Recently, scholars have observed that female supporters act primarily as 
disseminators in the Twitter-verse (Klausen, 2014). This trend is worth noting as male 
and female networks have traditionally been separate online, which has led to the 
dominant view in research that women are not as influential in comparison to their male 
counterparts (Conway, 2016; Sageman, 2008); however, as Huey and Peladeau (2016, 
p.18) have found, women’s activities on Twitter do in fact “create and sustain 
radicalizing milieus.”  
                                                 
18 The handle @shamiwitness derives from the Arabic name for Syria (Liang, 2015). 
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The female population of pro-jihadist Twitter supporters is referred to as the Umm 
Network or Umm Factor (Liang, 2015; Klausen, 2014).19 Women within these networks 
support and sustain the ORM through tweets that provide emotional support or by posting 
more radical and menacing content (Huey & Peladeau, 2016). Notably, female ISIS 
supporters provide ideological support, highlighting ummah counter-narratives in an 
attempt to instill “ummah consciousness” – a perception that Muslims make up a single 
community that is constantly under attack by the West (Hoyle et al., 2015; Saltman & 
Smith, 2015, p. 21). Specifically, they discuss the ummah in the context of baqiyah – or 
an extended family. (Amarasingam, 2015; Huey & Peladeau, 2016; Huey & Witmer, 
2016).Tweets by female pro-jihadists are often dichotomous, declaring that one either 
stands in solidarity with the ummah or stands against it (Saltman & Smith, 2010). This 
attitude is critical to fostering a-group mentality (McCauley et al., 2008). Group 
identification enhances the emotions one may feel towards a political issue and leads to a 
higher level of commitment to the in-group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; van 
Stekelenburg, 2014). 
 In some cases, women do use Twitter in more explicit ways to support IS. 
Specifically, pro-IS women often tweet about making hijra, to IS-held territory, which is 
the main goal of the IS’s social media strategy (Hoyle et al., 2015; Huey & Peladeau, 
2015; Peresin, 2015; Saltman & Smith, 2015). This phenomenon has garnered a 
                                                 
19 The Umm Network or Umm Factor title derives from the Arabic kunya, umm, an 
honorific title meaning mother (Klausen, 2014). Pro-IS females use this kunya in their 
Twitter handles to identify their gender (ibid). Females may also use the kunya bint, 
meaning ‘daughter’ (Berger & Morgan, 2015). 
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significant amount of attention in the media, with headlines focusing on jihadi brides, 
women who travel for the purpose of getting married (Bloom, 2011; Katherine Brown, 
2014; Saltman & Smith, 2015). These muhajirat may also tweet about life within IS-held 
territory once they have arrived, providing advice for others who are considering making 
the journey (Hoyle et al., 2015: Peresin & Cervone, 2015; Saltman et al., 2015).20 
Further, they may also use Twitter to post images or tweets of different aspects their life 
in Syria, such as their family (Hoyle et al., 2015; Huey & Peladeau, 2016; Klausen, 2014; 
Liang, 2015).  
Some female pro-jihadist supporters also encourage and attempt to justify 
violence on Twitter (Hoyle et al. 2015; Huey & Peladeau, 2016; Peresin, 2015; Smith as 
cited in Brown, 2014). However, this support falls on a spectrum, ranging from women 
who may voice their support in the form of prayers for fighters, to women who encourage 
others to commit lone-wolf attacks. Aqsa Mahmood, mentioned in the Introduction of 
this thesis, is an example of the latter. Mahmood has been observed by researchers to be 
an avid supporter and inciter or violence (Hoyle, et al. 2014; New York, 2014; Peresin, et 
al., 2014). (Hoyle et al., 2015; Peresin & Cervone, 2015; Zavadski, 2014). Mahmood 
frequently outlines the benefits of making hijra to IS-held territory, or for individuals 
who are not able to do so, she attempts to encourage them to commit acts of terrorism 
(Hoyle et al., 2016).  
                                                 
20 Muhajirah or muhajirat is Arabic for “female migrant” (Peresin & Cervone, 2015). 
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2.4 The Current Study 
 The preceding literature review has explained how Pro-IS supporters have used 
Twitter to create an ORM, which normalizes pro-jihadist behaviors and facilitates the 
process of radicalization in two ways. First, by connecting with other individuals online 
and fostering weak ties, and second, by influencing followers with pro-IS propaganda. 
This chapter has also explained how female users play an integral role in this process by 
posting content that is intended to provide emotional support for ISIS, encourage 
violence and recruit others. Yet, traditionally females in pro-jihadist environments have 
not been viewed as influential. The current study contributes to recent literature by 
exploring how female actors participate in to the pro-IS ORM using Twitter. 
2.4.1 Social Network Analysis: A Method to Study Gender, 
Radicalization, and Twitter 
There are several reasons for using social network analysis (SNA) to examine 
female involvement in the pro-IS milieu. First, a review of the literature indicates SNA is 
particularly useful for studying radical networks online, with a variety of researchers 
having employed this method (J. M. Berger & Strathearn, 2013; J. Berger & Morgan, 
2015; Carter et al., 2014; Klausen et al., 2012; Klausen, 2014; Magdy, Darwish, & 
Weber, 2016; Sageman, 2008). For example, Klausen (2014) used SNA to examine 
networks of male Western Foreign Fighters in Syria to provide an overview of their 
interactions. She also observed how women fit into this larger network (ibid). Second, 
SNA allows researchers to analyze the process of radicalization in these milieus, by way 
of examining the strength of social ties and exertion of influence (Bouchard & Nash, 
2014). Finally, the Three Degrees of Influence and Strength of Weak Ties theories, which 
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can be applied to this thesis in order to develop a greater understanding of women’s 
influence, are based on SNA.  
2.4.2 Three Degrees of Influence Theory 
Christakis and Fowler (2011) developed the Three Degrees of Influence (TDI) 
theory. The theory explains that an individual can be influenced to engage in an activity 
or behavior based on what people around them are doing.21 The foundation for this 
theory is Stanley Milgram’s (1967) Small World Experiment, which found that every 
human is connected by six degrees of separation. Christakis and Fowler (2011) explain 
that while humans may be connected by six degrees, individuals that far in social space 
certainly cannot influence them. The TDI principle builds on Milgram’s (1967) work by 
clarifying that one must be in close proximity to another human if they are to be 
influenced. In fact, the authors have observed that an individual must be within three 
“hops” of an influencer in order to alter their behavior or actions accordingly (see Figure 
1). In SNA technical terms, this theory suggests that as long as the geodesic distance 
between two nodes (individuals) is relatively short and under three geodesics, one is able 
to feel the influence of the other. Outside of the three hops, influence seems to have little 
or no impact.22   
                                                 
21 The theory came from the authors’ studies in epidemiology, which examined behaviors 
that impact health. In a study on obesity, they explain how one’s weight is influenced by 
those around them; specifically, if one’s close friends were obese, they were 40% more 
likely to be obese themselves (Christakis & Fowler, 2007). 
22 See Christakis and Fowler (2011, p. 28-29) for the three hypotheses (intrinsic-decay, 
network instability, and evolutionary purpose) as to why influence becomes ineffective. 
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The TDI principle can be employed to explore the topics of radicalization, gender, 
and Twitter as it “applies to a broad range of attitudes, feelings, and behaviors, and it 
applies to the spread of phenomena as diverse as political views” (Christakis & Fowler, 
2011, p.28). First, it can provide insight into how influential a network based on female 
actors is through an analysis of the geodesic distances within that network. To illustrate, 
if the average distance between actors within the network is under three geodesics, this 
would indicate that female members of the milieu may be more successful in encouraging 
others to radicalize. Second, TDI provides the theoretical basis to comparatively examine 
which actors are more influential within the milieu, by evaluating centrality measures 
within the network.  
2.4.3 Strength of Weak Ties Theory 
 The Strength of Weak Ties was developed by Mark Granovetter (1973). He 
contends that one’s social experiences are based on their relationships to the individuals 
that they frequently communicate with, which includes family, friends, and 
acquaintances. Friends and family are considered strong ties, whereas acquaintances are 
weak ties. When an individual interacts with their acquaintances, they are exposed to 
Figure 1 Three Degrees of Influence Theory (adapted from Christakis & Fowler, 2011) 
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their acquaintances’ social networks (ibid) (see Figure 2). Acquaintances provide 
individuals with an opportunity to interact with others outside the handful of strong ties 
they have with friends and family and come into contact with new ways of thinking, 
beliefs, and ideologies. Removing these individuals from one’s life would result in 
complete isolation outside of an immediate network of family and friends (ibid). 
 
Figure 2: Strength of Weak Ties (Adapted from Granovetter, 1973) 
Kennedy and Weimann (2011) posit that the Strength of Weak Ties theory is 
extremely important to the study of terrorism. The authors relate SWT to the 
decentralization of terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, as there are more 
opportunities to foster weak ties with other groups of radical individuals (Kennedy & 
Weimann, 2011). Further, decentralization has coincided with the rise of the internet, 
causing a proliferation of these weak ties (ibid). Through weak ties, pro-jihadist 
supporters recruit others through processes of social bonding (ibid). Once a weak tie has 
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been established, the indoctrinated individual may adopt similar ideologies and 
behaviors, and the weak tie may develop into a stronger, more rigid tie (ibid).  
Combined with Granovetter’s (1973) initial theory, Kennedy and Weimann’s 
(2011) logic provides a theoretical perspective for this study. SWT can be employed 
alongside SNA metrics such as reciprocity to determine the strength of ties within a given 
milieu. For the purposes of this thesis, if network analysis reveals that rates of reciprocity 
are relatively low among a network of female pro-IS supporters, it may indicate low tie 
strength in the network (Petroczi, Bazsó, & Nepusz, 2007). Considering Kennedy and 
Weimann’s (2011) assertion, this would mean that pro-IS females have the potential to 
radicalize other individuals within a milieu. Conversely, if the group of female supporters 
has a high level of tie strength, this could indicate that members within the group have 
similar attitudes and behaviors, indicating that individuals’ beliefs and opinions towards 
violence have been radicalized.   
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Chapter 3  
3 Methodology 
  This chapter outlines the methods used in the analysis. It begins with a summary 
of the research questions, the sampling method, and the data collection process. 
Specifically, I review how influence, network distance, and tie strength were 
operationalized. I also outline the mathematical foundations for the corresponding SNA 
metrics and highlight some of the limitations of the SNA methodology. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the ethical concerns that arose in the study, as well as an 
explanation of how I addressed them. 
3.1 Research Questions 
        The goal of this study was to explore the network of pro-IS females on Twitter. 
To do so, I addressed three research questions: 
R1. How influential are pro-ISIS females, relative to their male counterparts 
(evaluated by betweenness centrality) on Twitter?  
 
R2. What is the average geodesic distance (the number of hops between two nodes) 
of the female pro-ISIS network?  
 
R3. How strong are the ties (the level of reciprocity) in the female pro-ISIS network 
on Twitter? 
 
3.2 Sampling Method 
 To answer the three research questions, I collected a sample of twenty female pro-
ISIS accounts (n=20) through purposive snowball sampling. I selected this sampling 
method because it has been shown to be a highly effective method for researching “hard-
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to-reach” populations (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 18).23 Perhaps for this reason, the 
snowball method is typically used to study radicalization on Twitter (Berger & Morgan, 
2015; Berger & Perez, 2016; Berger & Strathearn, 2013; Carter et al, 2014; Huey & 
Peladeau, 2016; Klausen, 2014).24 I determined that a sample of twenty accounts (n=20) 
would provide ample data to perform my analysis after two careful considerations. The 
first was that previous researchers – such as Berger and Strathearn (2013, p.3) – who 
studied the influence of online extremist networks have reported that only a relatively 
small number of accounts are influential and “highly engaged with extremist ideology” 
(Berger & Strathearn, 2013, p.3). In order to perform their analysis, Berger and 
Strathearn (2013) only used a sample of twelve seed accounts (n=12). By using a 
relatively similar sample size, I have ensured that this thesis aligns with commonly 
accepted methodological practices.25 Second, through the use of data mining techniques 
                                                 
23 Methodologically, pro-IS supporters are considered to be hard-to-reach as accounts are 
constantly suspended, deleted, and recreated (Wright, Denney, Pinkerton, Jansen, & 
Bryden, 2016). 
24 Within the literature, this method is referred to as selecting “seed accounts” (see 
Klausen, 2014) 
25 Berger and Strathern’s (2013) study provided the basis for one of the most significant 
studies on ISIS: the ISIS Twitter Census (see Berger & Morgan, 2015). The methodology 
used in this paper was also based on the initial paper by Berger and Strathearn, as 
explained by the authors (Berger & Morgan, 2015). However, it is important to note that 
other studies do differ in terms of n size, as there is no consensus on what a reasonable 
sample size is when studying this type of population. For example, Klausen (2014) used a 
seed sample of 59 (n=59), while Carter et al. used a sample of 120 (n=120) accounts to 
study Western Foreign Fighters.  
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through NodeXL, a sample of twenty would import thousands of vertices and edges, 
providing a substantial amount of data points to address the three research questions.26  
3.2.1 Procedures for Data Collection 
  
The purposive snowball sampling process included several six steps (See Figure 
1). First, I used Twitter’s search function to identify accounts that used hashtags or terms 
central to IS supporters. For example, I searched #Baqiyah, as the literature suggests this 
term is frequently used among this population to voice their support for ISIS 
(Amarasingham, 2015; Berger & Perez, 2016; Huey & Peladeau, 2016; Wright et al. 
2016). Using the search function, I retrieved a list of accounts that discussed pro-IS 
topics. I selected @Umm_GreenBird as my starting point, as she appeared to be a central 
node within a pro-IS network, with several hundred followers and more than 1,000 
tweets.27 I then employed the snowball sampling method; I reviewed the account’s 
follower and following lists and began to select users for the sample. I continued to 
review follower and following lists, selecting accounts until I had met my sample quota 
of twenty pro-IS female accounts.  
                                                 
26 In fact, researchers have noted that one of the main issues in conducting SNA on data 
from social networking sites such as Twitter is that too much data exists for proper 
analysis (Ediger et al., 2010) 
27 @Umm_GreenBird is a pseudonym used in place of the actual account name. All 
account names mentioned in this thesis have been anonymized for ethical reasons 
outlined in section 3.6 of this chapter.  
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Figure 3. Procedures for Data Collection 
 
To be considered eligible for inclusion in the sample, an account had to be 
unprotected and unsuspended as of August 9, 2016 (the date of data collection), post 
content indicating support for IS, have explicitly disclosed their gender on their profile, 
and predominantly tweet in English. Additionally, all members of the sample needed to 
have at least 61 followers and to have tweeted at least once since January 1, 2016.28 
These cut-off criteria were implemented to ensure that the sample reflected the active 
actors within pro-ISIS Twitter networks.  
 I employed coding practices based on existing literature in order to properly 
identify the gender and group supported by the user (see Appendix 2 for the coding 
guide). Coding for gender involved reviewing the Twitter account names or handles of 
                                                 
28 61 Twitter followers is the medium for active accounts (Bruner, 2013). 
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the sample. Gender was easily identifiable if an account included a kunya or nasab in the 
handle.29 For example, as discussed in the literature review of this thesis, female accounts 
generally included honorific titles within their account names, such as Umm or Bint 
(Klausen 2015).30 I also their profile pictures to discern gender. Female avatars also 
typically depicted women in burqas or kittens (see Appendix 3 for examples). To code 
for pro-IS support, I examined posting patterns and autobiographical descriptions (see 
Appendix 4-5 for examples). For example, supporters often posted pictures of the 
Tawheed, tweeted prayers for ISIS fighters or shout-outs to other IS supporters. They 
also frequently used ISIS-related hashtags, such as #IS, which were easily identifiable.  
To verify my coding, I had a fellow graduate student who is familiar with online 
posting patterns of pro-ISIS females code the data. They made an independent decision as 
to whether the account holder fit the inclusion criteria for the study. As well, in certain 
occurrences where a ‘tweep’ used a language that was not English, I used Google 
Translate to translate the text into English, and instructed my research assistant to do so 
as well. In these cases, I coded based on the English version of the tweet. 
3.3 Procedures for Analysis  
 The subsequent sections of this chapter detail the procedures I used to collect 
descriptive data and perform the analyses for the three research questions. 
                                                 
29 The kunya and nasab are components of traditional Muslim names. Each term refers to 
whether the individual is a mother or father, and a son or daughter, respectively (Dawson, 
Amarasingam, & Bain, 2016). 
30 Mother or daughter (ibid).  
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3.3.1 Descriptive Data  
 The process of radicalization is based on one’s relationships with other 
individuals within their ORM, so I explored the relationships and personal networks of 
the twenty female sample members (n=20). I used the NodeXL software to collect this 
data. I entered the list of sample accounts into the software and used the importer 
function to retrieve data on other accounts that engaged the users in the main sample, up 
to 2.0 levels away.31 I also restricted the import function to only retain the last 200 tweets 
of each user in the sample.32 In doing so, I accessed two types of information that would 
allow me to perform my analysis for my three research questions. First, the process 
returned a list of accounts (known as vertices), which have a relationship with an account 
in the main sample (that is, who interacted with a member of the sample). Second, I 
collected data on the relationships between these vertices, known as edges (specifically, 
whether someone in the sample was tweeted at, mentioned, replied to, followed someone 
else, or vice-versa). In order to analyze the data, I cleansed it set to ensure there were no 
duplicate edges or missing data. Finally, I used the visualization tool in NodeXL to create 
                                                 
31 This level imports an individual’s immediate connections, or alters, and their 
subsequent alters and ties. By using the highest level possible on NodeXL, I ensure I 
capture a more accurate picture of the total breadth of the pro-IS network on Twitter. 
32 Similar studies, such as Berger & Morgan’s (2015) ISIS Twitter Census, typically 
analyze data only from a user’s 200 most recent tweets. Twitter’s Application Program 
Interface (API) is limited to 180 queries per fifteen minutes, making it difficult to extract 
over 200 tweets per user (Hansen, Schneiderman, & Smith, 2010). 
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a sociogram and used the Harel-Koren Fast Multiscale layout to present the relationships 
between the different nodes in the sample.33  
3.3.2 Research Question One 
R1. How influential are pro-ISIS females relative to their male counterparts 
(evaluated by betweenness centrality) on Twitter?  
 
 The first step in addressing R1 was to identify the influencers in the female pro-IS 
network. Within the literature on social network analysis, Twitter and extremism, there is 
no agreement on how to measure influence. It is operationalized in a variety of ways, 
ranging from the amount of times an individual is mentioned or retweeted, to SNA 
centrality scores (Carter et al., 2014; Berger & Morgan, 2015; Berger & Strathearn, 2011; 
Klausen, 2014). For the purpose of this study, I operationalized influence as a node with a 
high normalized betweenness centrality score, relative to other nodes within the 
networks. Normalized betweenness centrality was the best metric to measure influence 
for this thesis for several reasons. First, this measure of centrality has been specifically 
identified as a means to identify influential actors that have many abilities, one of which 
is to control the movement of information within the network (Borgatti, 2004; Freeman, 
1979, Gruzd, Wellman, & Takhteyev, 201; Newman, 2003). Evidently, this ability is 
critical in disseminating propaganda within the pro-IS milieu. Second, this measure bases 
influence on a calculation of the space between different actors within the network, 
complementing R2 (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
                                                 
33 In studies that employ SNA, it is often up to the author to determine which layout to 
use as there is no precedent. I selected the Harel-Koren Layout as it is known to provide 
high quality visuals for large networks (Harel & Koren, 2001). 
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Within undirected networks, betweenness centrality is a measure of how often a 
certain node is on the shortest path between all vertices in a network (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994).34 Accounts which have a had a high centrality score are the nodes which 
information must pass through in order to reach other individuals (ibid). To calculate 
betweenness centralities, I first transformed the data into a nondirectional set using 
UCInet, as NodeXL imports directed data.35 I then used Freeman’s (1978) model to 
calculate the betweenness centrality of each actor within UCInet: 
 Freeman (1979) assumes that communication in the networks takes place over the 
shortest path between two actors, j and k, and all paths have an equal chance of being 
selected (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Betweenness centrality calculates the sum of 
probabilities that actor i lies on the paths between actors j and k. Therefore, gjk is the 
number of geodesics between the two actors, j and k. In turn, gjk(ni) is “the number of 
geodesics lining the two actors that contain actor i” (ibid, p.190). Finally, gjk(ni)/ gjk is the 
probability that the path which contains i will be selected for communication. Equation 1 
is normalized by dividing the centrality score by the number of vertices, excluding actor 
i: 
                                                 
34 “Undirected” refers to data sets where the direction of ties is not relevant; rather, just 
the tie itself is important.  Conversely, in directed networks much more attention is paid 
to the direction of ties. For example, if @janedoe follows @johndoe, or vice-versa. 
35 It is common to undirect data when analyzing centrality measures such as betweenness 
in directed networks (Ediger et al., 2010) 
 
𝐶𝐵(𝑛𝑖) = ∑ 𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑗>𝑘
(𝑛𝑖)/𝑔𝑗𝑘 
(1) 
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 The normalized equation turns raw centrality scores into values that can only lie 
in the range of [0,1] (ibid).36 If actor i had a high normalized betweenness centrality, they 
lay on more frequently travelled paths (ibid). Conversely, if actor i had a low score, they 
lay on paths that are less frequently travelled (ibid).  
This research question also considered how influential female pro-IS Twitter 
users are in comparison with their male counterparts. To do so, I created a spreadsheet of 
all nodes and their corresponding normalized centralities after running the betweenness 
function in UCInet. I ranked the nodes from highest to lowest centralities. My analysis 
was performed on the top fifty accounts.37 I reviewed each account individually in this 
list ensuring that I would be able to analyze specific variables including gender and 
posting patterns, as NodeXL does not import certain demographic information. If I could 
not obtain this information about an account by manually importing it, the account was 
dropped from the analytic sample for this question, and the account with the next lowest 
rank was moved up. Finally, I calculated the proportion of males and females among the 
fifty most influential accounts to determine who had more influence within the network.  
                                                 
36 The definition of normalization, in the context of this chapter, differs from the 
definition of normalization explained in the literature review. Here, normalization strictly 
refers to the quantitative procedure which allows for comparing the betweenness 
centralities of different actors.  
37In Berger & Strathearn’s (2013) study on Twitter and extremism, they focused their 
analysis on the top ten and top fifty most popular accounts, as there are typically only a 
small handful of central actors within the networks. I opted to analyze the same number 
of actors to prevent observing Twitter users that were not influential and did not impact 
radicalization.  
𝐶′𝐵(𝑛𝑖) = 𝐶𝐵(𝑛𝑖)/[(𝑔 − 1)(𝑔 − 2)/2] (2) 
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3.3.3 Research Question Two 
R2. What is the average geodesic distance (the number of hops between two 
nodes) of the female pro-ISIS network?  
 
 This question complements R1, as network distance impacts the way influence is 
disseminated in social networks (Christakis & Fowler, 2011). Wasserman and Faust 
(1994) explained that the measure is useful when evaluating the transmission of 
messages. If the length of a geodesic (the shortest distance between two individuals in a 
network) is relatively short, information would travel through the network quickly, since 
messages usually take the shortest route in networks (ibid). For this study, network 
distance is a valuable insight, as it can indicate how quickly information can travel 
through the network, and also whether other members of the network are within three 
hops of influential female actors. I found the average network distances of all four 
networks at large by using running the overall metrics for the network in NodeXL. The 
equation to find these distances is (Oliveira & Gama, 2012): 
Equation 3 is the “[t]he average geodesic distance for all combinations of vertex 
pairs in a network” (ibid, N.p.). In the equation, d(i,j) represents the geodesic distance 
between the two nodes, i and j (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The denominator, 
1
2
   𝑛(𝑛 − 1), is the maximum amount of edges in the network, which has n nodes 
(Oliveira & Gamma, 2012).  
3.3.4 Research Question Three 
R3. How strong are the ties (the level of reciprocity) in the female pro-ISIS 
network on Twitter? 
   𝑙  =  
1
1
2   𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
 ∑ 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑖≥𝑗
 
(3) 
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 Tie strength has proven to be one of the most popular and insightful metrics of 
network science, revealing whether a network’s structure is composed of rigid 
relationships or weak acquaintances (Gilbert & Karahalios, 2009). As explained by 
Kennedy and Weimann (2011), tie strength is extremely useful for studying the 
recruitment and radicalization patterns of terrorist groups online because varying levels 
of strength correspond with different outcomes. For example, weak ties may indicate a 
group in which extremist ideologies are not as pronounced in their infancy, but there is 
room for radicalization to occur (ibid). Conversely, strong ties may indicate that a group 
is radicalized and shares extremist ideology (ibid). Evaluating the tie strength of a 
network will allow me to discern whether the pro-IS female Twitter network poses a 
threat for radicalizing others.  
Theoretically, tie strength can be evaluated by analyzing the intensity, intimacy, 
and reciprocity of a relationship (Granovetter, 1973). On a practical level, it is impossible 
to evaluate all of these dimensions of strength on Twitter, as the platform is public, and 
therefore intimacy and intensity may be non-existent (Takhteyev, Gruzd, Wellman, 
2012). Reciprocity proves to be an exception, as mutuality can be evaluated more easily 
by accounting for dyads (a couple of accounts) that either follow, retweet, reply to, or 
mention each other. Therefore, I operationalize tie strength as the reciprocity of a dyadic 
relationship (i.e. if one account has an outgoing relationship to another account, which 
has a returning connection), measured by NodeXL as the ratio of reciprocated ties within 
the network, as shown in Equation 4 (Oliveria & Gama, 2012): 
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 This proportional measure divides the number of mutual dyads (again, the number 
of vertices that have both an incoming and outgoing connection) over the number of all 
possible dyads, which accounts for asymmetric dyads, in which one account may not 
retweet, reply, follow, or mention accounts despite the other doing so (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). 
3.4 Limitations of the Social Network Analysis Method 
 
The SNA method has two important limitations. First, SNA focuses on the structure 
of networks and not the contextual factors that may impact actor agency within the 
network, such as specific drivers to radicalization (Borgatti, Brass, & Halgin, 2014; Scott, 
2000). I addressed this limitation by accounting for specific demographic characteristics 
(gender and group support) in my sampling process. Further, I discuss my data in relation 
to two theories: Three Degrees of Influence (TDI) and Strength of Weak Ties (SWT). By 
incorporating these theories into the analysis, I attempt to account for external 
information and minimize the extent of the limitation (Wölfer, Faber, & Hewstone, 
2015).  
There are other possible solutions that can be employed in future studies to 
develop a greater understanding of context. For example, Scott (2010) explains that 
researchers can apply mixed-methods to observe social networks. For research on Twitter 
and radicalization, scholars may consider combining analyses of networks with an 
analysis of the content of tweets by using qualitative methods or sentiment analysis.    
𝑟 =
# 𝑚𝑢𝑡
#𝑚𝑢𝑡 +  #𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 
(4) 
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The second issue with SNA studies is related to boundary issues (Wolfer et al., 
2015). As Wolfer et al. (2015, p. 57-58) explain: 
In contrast to conventional sampling procedures, individuals in social networks 
are not sampled independently, but result from and are exposed to the 
interdependencies within a certain network boundary.  
 
Therefore, researchers must pay particular attention to the boundaries they set at the onset 
of their studies (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1983). Specifically, researchers must 
decide how large or small of a network to sample. This issue is particularly prominent in 
SNA studies using Twitter data, as researchers are limited by the amount of relationships 
they can import; the Twitter Application Program Interface (API) restricts abilities to 
sample extensive networks easily38. To address this limitation, I selected a network 
boundary definition (sampling the networks of twenty females, with the API import 
function limited to the 200 most recent tweets) that was based on existing standards.  
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
 This study passed ethical approval by the Research Ethics Board (REB) at the 
University of Western Ontario on December 5, 2014 (see Appendix 6). Mining social 
networking sites is a relatively new way of studying social phenomena, and as a result, 
researchers have identified a number of issues regarding the appropriateness of using 
these sites’ data for research. For example, a central question in the literature is whether 
or not data on social media is truly public (Boyd & Crawford, 2012; McCay-Peet & 
Quan-Haase, 2016). Quan-Haase and McCay-Peet (2016) also question the issue of 
                                                 
38 The API has a 180 inquiry within fifteen-minute rating, meaning that there are 
technical limitations preventing one from reaching an extensive network boundary in a 
relatively short period of time (Hansen et al., 2010)  
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boundary specification in relation to ethics and address whether or not relational data 
(such as likes and follows) are fair play for data analysis within social media research.  
Specific ethical procedures were taken to ensure this thesis addressed the ethical 
concerns mentioned. Names of account holders, Twitter handles, and time stamps were 
altered in this thesis, as this is considered an appropriate low-risk way to prevent ethical 
breaches (Sloan & Quan-Haase, 2016). I also ensured that all information and analysis on 
accounts was kept on a password-protected computer and encrypted hard drive. Finally, 
to be eligible for inclusion within the sample, accounts had to be unprotected. Twitter 
users have the opportunity to select certain privacy settings, and by opting to be 
unprotected, they acknowledge that any information they post on the website is visible to 
the world. As a result, there was no need to gain consent from these users to include their 
accounts as part of the sample.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Results 
 This chapter reviews the results of the study. The first section details the 
descriptive data reported in Table 1 and presents an analysis of the sociogram depicting 
the female pro-IS network (Figure 1). The second section of this chapter addresses the 
three research questions. The findings for the first research question, presented in Table 
2, indicate that females within the sample are more influential than males. Results for the 
second research question, which considers the average geodesic distance of the network, 
are presented in Table 3 and show that it takes a total of 3.6 hops for information to travel 
through the network. The chapter concludes with the findings of the third research 
question; an analysis of the sample network’s reciprocity values, found in Table 4, shows 
that only 36.8 percent of ties between users reciprocated.  
4.1 Descriptive Data  
Table 1 reports descriptive data for the sample female pro-IS network. A total of 
5,861 vertices, or Twitter accounts, were imported using NodeXL. Among these 
accounts, there were a total of 12,034 edges, which consist of a combined sum of 12,034 
retweets, follows, mentions, and replies within the network. A unique edge is an instance 
where one user mentions another account only once. Of all edges in the network, 80.10% 
(n= 9,640) were unique. Edges were duplicated, or considered not unique, in 19.90% 
(n=2,394) of the network. This value reports there was a repetition in an interaction 
between two nodes of the network in almost 20% of the sample. Using the example 
mentioned above, a duplicate edge is an instance where one user may have tweeted at 
another user within the network multiple times. Self-loops – where an edge from one 
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node leads back to itself, such as when a user tweets at him or herself – made up 11.44% 
(n=1,377) of the total 12,034 relationships in the sample.  
Table 1. Descriptive Data  
Graph Metric Value 
Vertices 
 
          Total Vertices (n) 5,861 
Edges 
          Unique Edges (n) 9,640 
          Edges with Duplicates (n) 2,394 
          Total Edges (n) 12,034 
          Self-Loops (n) 1,377 
Cohesion 
          Connected Components (n) 1 
          Single-Vertex Connected Components (n) 0 
          Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component (n) 5,861 
          Maximum Edges in a Connected Component (n) 12,034 
          Density (p)  0.0003 
 
Table 1 also shows data regarding the cohesion of the network. All nodes within 
this network are connected in some way, as there is only one connected component 
(comprising the 5,861 vertices and 12,034 edges) and zero single vertex components. 
This result was expected, as when using snowball or seed sampling, NodeXL only 
imports individuals that are connected to the starter nodes in some way. Density, or the 
proportion of actual relationships over all possible connections, is another metric reported 
in Table 1. Density is relatively low in the pro-IS female network, as only 0.0003% of the 
network comprises actual edges. Therefore, despite the fact that on an aggregate level, the 
network is completely connected, the users within the network do not all interact with 
each other.  
Figure 3 displays the data presented in Table 1. Twitter logo icons within the 
figure represent the initial accounts used for snowball sampling. As shown by the 
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sociogram in Figure 3, the majority of accounts in the sample fall within the center of the 
graph among other nodes, as they are more central or influential, in the network. The 
interact with each other on a higher basis, meaning their number of retweets, mentions 
and follows are higher relative to others within the graph. However, there are hundreds of 
accounts that drift towards the peripheries of the sociogram. These accounts are less 
central and have a more distant connection to other members of the network. They may 
only mention or reply to one central node that is more connected to others within the 
network.  
 
 
Figure 3. Harel-Koren Layout of the Sample Pro-IS Female Network 
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The sample includes a handful of hubs, which are “highly connected users” 
(Smith, Rainie, Shneiderman, Himelboim, 2014, N.p.) (see Appendix 7). These accounts 
represent individuals who are at the center of small communities within the network. The 
users around them are considered their spokes. There are a few different types of hub and 
spoke models. Broadcast networks occur when the spokes may retweet the main hub but 
do not tweet at each other (ibid). In this case, information flows towards the hub and 
away from the spokes. Conversely, in a support network, the hub directs ties towards its 
spokes, and as a result, ties are in the opposite direction of those in a broadcast network 
(ibid). It is important to note that within this pro-IS network, the hubs share qualities of 
both-inbound and outbound networks. For example, as with a broadcast hub, users in 
these hub and spoke communities do not necessarily communicate with each other. 
Rather, they seem to consume propaganda directly from the closest influential actor they 
are linked to, avoiding the other people in their community. However, in certain cases, 
the hub mimics support behaviors, as it may retweet or mention the spokes.  
There are a significant number of bridges within the network (see Appendix 8). 
Bridges are accounts that do not necessarily have many connections within the female 
pro-IS network; they only retweet, follow, or mention a small number of other accounts. 
Yet, they play a critical role in disseminating propaganda within the network, as they 
connect “otherwise disconnected groups” (Smith et al., n.p.). These actors are especially 
important within this female pro-IS network, since density is low and connections are not 
as cohesive as they could be. As a result, these bridge actors have a higher centrality 
score relative to other members of the network.  
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4.2 Research Question Results 
4.2.1 Research Question One 
 Table 2 shows the results for the proportion of males and females in the top fifty 
accounts with the highest influence, as ranked by the normalized betweenness centrality 
score (nBetweenness). Within the top fifty most influential accounts within the pro-IS 
sample, it appears that females are represented more than their male counterparts, making 
up 62% of the list versus 38% for males. These proportions indicate that most accounts 
get their information primarily from female users. Thus, female users are more influential 
within the network. As the hubs and bridges that ensure the sub communities stay 
informed on topics by posting propaganda or other tweets on their profiles, it appears that 
female users are the knowledge brokers of the network. Without these 31 female accounts 
in the sample, the network would be largely disconnected, and information would not be 
able to effectively flow to other accounts. In other words, accounts have to receive tweets 
from female accounts to stay informed. Conversely, if a user wants to pass information 
on to others within the network, that user must go through a female actor who can 
broadcast it for them.  
 Table 2 also shows some critical information on the spread of the nBetweenness 
values. For the minority group, males, the mean was relatively similar to the standard 
deviation (1.75 and 1.73, respectively). The range of these values was 6.71, with a 
minimum of 0.41 and a maximum of 6.58. These values indicate that the males in the top 
fifty were consistently uninfluential. As a result, members of the sample network would 
not turn to these male users for information and would not tweet, mention, reply to, or 
follow them. Conversely, for the females represented in the top fifty, data was extremely 
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widespread. To illustrate, the 31 females had an average nBetweenness value of 6.62, 
with a standard deviation of 10.10. The range of values was 36.91, with a minimum of 40 
and a maximum of 37.31. The large spread and high standard deviation, relative to the 
mean, shows that while females may be more represented within the upper echelon of the 
network, their values are not consistently high. Accordingly, while other individuals in 
the network may be more directly connected to these females, they are not necessarily 
following, retweeting, and mentioning them at a consistent rate. Rather, there are certain 
females that are constantly in communication with those around them and a high 
proportion of females that are not as communicative. 
Table 2. Descriptive Table for Top 50 Accounts Ranked by nBetweenness. 
 
4.2.2 Research Question Two  
Table 3 details the average and maximum geodesic distances for the sample 
network. 39  This table indicates that the average shortest distance between all accounts in 
the networks is 3.6 hops. Therefore, in order for users to share content with other users 
throughout the network, they must cross over a handful of other individuals to do so. This 
pattern indicates that nodes do not necessarily communicate directly with each other (if 
                                                 
39 Additional analyses using the UCInet software, showed different results: The average 
geodesic distance was 4.4, with a standard deviation of 1.5. However, 48.80%% of ties 
were excluded from the calculation. There is no way to check UCInet or nodeXL’s 
backend codes to explain these differences.  
Variable Frequency 
(n) 
Percentage 
(%)  
Mean  
  
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Gender       
      Male 19 38 1.75 1.73 .41 6.58 
      Female 31 62  6.62 10.10 .40 37.31 
Total 50 100 4.77 8.32 .40 37.31 
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this were the case, the average distance would be one geodesic). In addition to this lack of 
communication between nodes, there are several other factors restricting the channels of 
communication within the network, thus severely impacting average geodesic distance. 
First, users must frequently go through bridges or spokes to communicate with others. In 
addition, network density is relatively low, so members of the sample have to rely on 
communicating through the handful of individuals with a high proportion of 
nBetweenness centrality, which also impacts the average network distance. 
Table 3 also shows that the maximum value for the shortest path length between 
two accounts within the network is 6 hops. For a user to pass information from one end of 
the network to the other, they must pass through 6 other users. Looking at the average in 
relation to this value provides an interesting picture of the female pro-IS network; the 
diameter is only 2.4 hops larger than the average distance. Thus, the nodes in the network 
are not situated close together relative to the total breadth of the network.  
Table 3. Geodesic Distance Results 
Metric Average Maximum 
Geodesic Distance 3.6 6 
 
4.2.3 Research Question Three 
 The results for tie strength are listed in Table 4. On Twitter, accounts can engage 
in reciprocal behaviors by following, tweeting, or re-tweeting one another. Within the 
network, 36.80% of ties (with the exception of self-loops and duplicated edges) were 
reciprocated. Complementing this percentage, 63.20% of ties (also with the exception of 
self-loops and duplicated edges) were not reciprocated. These percentages indicate that 
the network is not symmetric, or bi-directional; within the female pro-IS network, the 
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majority of users do not converse back-and-forth with each other. A user may tweet 
another user within the network, but the likelihood that they will receive a response from 
that user is small. In technical terms, the proportion of asymmetrical edges (one-way 
relationships), combined with the number of symmetrical edges (two-way relationships) 
outweigh the sum of the symmetrical edges. In this sense, most members of this sample 
are lone wolves and their online interactions are typically shaped by solitary experiences. 
This value can also be interpreted as the relationships being unequal, as on average, one 
individual is often reach out to others with no response. However, the fairly small 
percentage of reciprocity does suggest that in certain instances, accounts in the network 
are inclined to respond to those within their online community.  
Table 4. Tie Strength Results 
 Metric Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Reciprocity   
          Reciprocated Edges 3041 36.80 
          Unreciprocated Edges 5222 63.20 
          Total Edges 8263 100.00 
Note: Percentages were rounded to two decimal places. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Discussion 
 The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the findings of the study. The first 
section explains how females within the sample were more influential, compared to their 
male counterparts. The second section examines the high average geodesic distance 
result. This result shows that, while certain users within the sample network acted as key 
influencers, the network was not influential on an aggregate level; however, I caution 
against ignoring the population because of this result.   The third section explains that 
individuals within the female pro-ISIS sample network were susceptible to radicalization 
due to the low level of reciprocated ties between different users. The chapter concludes 
by discussing the study’s implications for public safety officials, Twitter, and other 
scholars, as well as the study’s limitations. I also present some considerations for future 
research.  
5.1 Research Question One 
R1. How influential are pro-ISIS females, relative to their male counterparts 
(evaluated by betweenness centrality) on Twitter?  
 This study found that among the top 50 most influential accounts (ranked by 
Freeman’s normalized betweenness centrality scores), there were 31 accounts held by 
females and 19 accounts held by males. There are two main lessons from these results. 
First, females were more influential than males within the sample, since they were often 
at the center of the ties within the network and were the hubs and bridges holding the 
network together. This result aligns with previous studies that have found female 
accounts to be disseminators –users that position radical attitudes as normal— or even 
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‘cool’—by  posting pro-IS propaganda (Huey, 2015; Klausen, 2014; Picart, 2015). 
Accordingly, female users within pro-jihadist social media networks have unique 
opportunities to determine what information other individuals in the ORM are exposed 
to, and help establish a strong in-group mentality or ummah consciousness. As a result, 
these influencers can radicalize other females within their respective social media 
networks. 
 Second, the results of R1 indicate that male and female networks are separate on 
Twitter. Female users control the information in the female pro-IS network. This finding 
supports existing literature, which observes that males and females are segregated in pro-
jihadist terrorist networks, both on and offline (Sageman, 2008). For example, women 
such as Shamima Begum were active within their own communities, or umm network, 
tweeting at other popular “sisters,” like Aqsa Mahmood (Klausen, 2014; Liang, 2014). 
Conversely, in male Western Foreign Fighter networks on Twitter, male users, such as 
Anjem Choudhry or Ahmad Musa Jibril, were more popular (Klausen, 2014; Carter et al. 
2015; Chatfield et al. 2014). Scholars point to Salafist principles as a contributing factor 
for the division, since women and men typically support terrorism differently within the 
pro-IS Twitter ORMs. To illustrate, women may provide emotional support by praying or 
making duas for males engaged in martyrdom operations on Twitter (Huey & Peladeau, 
2016). Conversely, their male counterparts engage in overt calls for violence and tweet 
directly from the frontlines (Klausen, 2014).  
5.2 Research Question Two 
R2. What is the average geodesic distance (the number of hops between two 
nodes) of the female pro-ISIS network?  
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 The average geodesic distance result for the sample female pro-IS network was 
3.6 hops, whereas the diameter, or maximum, was 6. Revisiting the Three Degrees of 
Influence Theory (TDI) initially discussed in Chapter 2, an individual is only influential 
to those around them if they are within three hops of the influencer (see Figure 1). 
Considering this theory, the results of the social network analysis suggest that the female 
pro-IS network was not influential as a whole since, on average, individuals had to cross 
the three-hop threshold to transmit information or send propaganda to others in the 
network. However, it is important to keep in mind that within the network, females were 
more influential than males, as discussed in Section 5.1. Together, these two results show 
that within the female pro-IS Twitter network there were certain females who were 
highly influential despite the network not being influential as a whole.  This finding is 
valuable because it suggests that the majority of females within these networks are not 
well-versed in the art of radicalizing other women on social media like Mahmood. 
Nonetheless, high geodesic distance does not warrant ignoring the female pro-IS 
population on Twitter or making claims they do not play a part in the process of 
radicalizing other women, for two reasons. First, women who tweet radical propaganda – 
regardless of how far apart they are in social space – still contribute to an in-group 
mentality that normalizes attitudes in favor of pro-jihadist terrorism; they may not be an 
overt threat, but do sustain their respective milieu (Huey & Peladeau, 2016). Despite the 
fact that many users within this network are not influential, closely examining the female 
pro-IS network can help investigators determine which key nodes have the potential to 
radicalize other users. Second, the network’s high geodesic distance makes it relatively 
difficult to dismantle and unresponsive to attempts to take it off the web (Morselli, 
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Giguère, & Petit, 2007). Morselli et al. (2007) explain that within extremist networks 
(e.g. The group responsible for the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade 
Centre), greater geodesic distance is fairly common (ibid). In fact, a high average 
geodesic distance ensures a level of security and protection for network members, as the 
network is spread out and individuals are not in close reach of each other. As a result, it 
takes investigators a significant amount of time to identify each member of the network 
and determine how they all connect to one another. Other researchers have identified that, 
on Twitter, account suspensions are the method of choice to combat the pro-IS ORM; 
however, these attempts lead to a whack-a-mole problem, in which accounts continue to 
pop back up and gain more of a following (Berger & Perez, 2016; Wright et al., 2016). 
An echo chamber of pro-IS messages is created, as ‘tweeps’ feel they are being attacked, 
further reinforcing these users’ sense of in-group solidarity (Berger & Morgan, 2015). 
Thus, the high geodesic distance, may actually give female pro-IS networks an advantage 
in terms sustaining the milieu, since they are spread out. In this sense, the TDI theory 
may not be wholly applicable to networks of pro-ISIS supporters, since it does not 
account for the strategic purposes of being more distant in social space.  
5.3 Research Question Three 
R3. How strong are the ties (the level of reciprocity) in the female pro-ISIS 
network on Twitter? 
The fact that 36.8% (a minority) of ties within the sample network were 
reciprocated signifies that accounts mainly tweeted, replied to or mentioned other 
accounts without receiving responses by the accounts with which they were attempting to 
make contact. Consequently, this network has a low level of tie strength. Kennedy and 
Weimann’s (2011) elaboration on Granovetter’s (1973) Strength of Weak Ties (SWT) 
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theory provides more context for this result. Weak ties are thought to increase the level of 
social solidarity or macro social integration (ibid). If the sample female pro-IS network 
had strong ties, there would be strongly connected components, indicating ideological 
similarity (ibid). The network’s low tie strength, however, suggests that users in the 
network did not necessarily have total ideological similarity, or the same attitudes 
towards ISIS. Low tie strength could be attributed to the fact that Twitter networks of 
pro-IS users contain a variety of different groups of accounts (Chatfield et al., 2015). For 
example, a recruiter may follow a variety of IS supporters also in addition to news media 
or other individuals with varying levels of support for terrorism (ibid). Additionally, 
some Twitter supporters of IS have been known to alter their opinions or beliefs over the 
course of their involvement, thus showing a complex history and variety of content posts 
–so any given user may have a network comprising a variety of opinions and beliefs 
(Hoyle et al., 2015). The low level of tie strength also relates to the structure of the pro-IS 
ORM, as there are many bridges within weak-tie communities (Kennedy & Weimann, 
2011). Bridge accounts, or accounts that connect two groups who might otherwise be 
unconnected, ensure that members of the network are still able to access information 
regarding ISIS even if they are not deeply entrenched within the network. As a result, key 
female IS players can strategically use their positions as influencers or bridges to entice 
other female users to support the Salafist ideology and encourage pro-jihadist terrorism 
through ensuring their online posts appeal to this group. Precisely for this reason—
because it is held together by weak ties—the female pro-IS ORM still has room to grow 
and develop traction on Twitter. 
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5.4 Implications of the Study 
The results of this thesis can contribute to discussions surrounding the need for 
policy changes to address female pro-jihadist radicalization.40 Current counter-
radicalization efforts have been largely focused on pro-jihadist men. In Canada, strategies 
to counter violent pro-jihadist extremism target male Western Foreign Fighters (Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service, 2016) . Public Safety Canada (2016) has only recently 
begun to view women within these groups as an “emerging threat” because several 
hundred  have migrated to ISIS-held territory to marry (Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service, 2016; Public Safety Canada, 2016). In the UK, counter-radicalization efforts are 
also centered around males. For example, 90% of referrals for the Prevent Program were 
male (Vidino & Brandon, 2012).41 Evidently, a policy blind spot has developed around 
female contributors to pro-jihadist terrorism, and a better understanding of female posters 
within these networks has become necessary.  
The findings of this thesis can contribute to an appropriate policy shift in two 
particular ways. First, the knowledge that pro-jihadist females do have the ability to 
                                                 
40 It is important to note that the recommendations posed in the section are limited by the 
sampling methods used to execute this study (amongst other factors noted in the 
following section). Accordingly, these implications may not be generalized.  
41 The Channel Programme is “a multi-agency approach to identify and provide support 
to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government, 2015, p. 
3). It is part of the broader Prevent program, which is “the counter-terrorist programme 
which aims to stop people being drawn into terrorist-related activity” (HM Government, 
2011, p. 11). 
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radicalize other females on Twitter could be used in building training sessions to equip 
public safety officials with a more nuanced understanding of the unique ways in which 
pro-jihadist females support terrorist groups, like ISIS, on social media. In fact, more 
rigorous training of public safety officials has been viewed as a critical element in 
furthering counter-radicalization efforts (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). With training that 
accounts for the theme of female pro-jihadist supporters, investigators could become 
more effective at identifying individuals—both male and female—who currently support 
ISIS or are in the process of radicalizing. This training must stress the need to understand 
topics discussed by female pro-IS supporters. For example, officials should be educated 
on Salafist-related propaganda or discussions of the ummah consciousness. As a result, 
they can effectively investigate individuals who are posting propaganda touching on 
these themes. The consequences of not incorporating these elements into training could 
lead to an increased policy blind spot and contribute to Islamophobia as individuals could 
be mischaracterized as being radical, or radicalizing others, when they are not.  
Second, public safety officials can create programs specific to women and girls 
who may be on the fringes of radicalizing and expose them to counter-narratives to break 
away from ummah consciousness (Hoyle et al., 2015; Saltman & Smith, 2015). Again, 
these approaches should be tailored to females who have online connections (or weak 
ties) to other known pro-jihadist supporters or those female who are posting radical 
propaganda online. In doing so, it ensures that the programs specifically address the issue 
of pro-ISIS radicalization, and prevent mischaracterizing females who may be discussing 
their religion online.   An example of such a program could be working with educators in 
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high schools and post-secondary educational institutions to help promote a critical 
awareness of online media (Neumann & Stevens, 2012; Saltman & Smith, 2015).  
 The second recommendation of this thesis is directed to social media companies 
such as Twitter. Currently, Twitter (2016b) does not hesitate to suspend pro-jihadist 
terrorist accounts, explaining that 360,000 accounts have been suspended since mid-2015 
“for threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily related to ISIS.” Twitter’s strategy 
focuses on responding to reported accounts and “leverag[ing] proprietary spam-fighting 
tools to surface other potentially violating accounts for review by our agents” (Twitter, 
2016b, N.p); however, as noted within previous sections of this thesis, this approach is 
not working, despite claims of efficacy (Berger & Perez, 2016; Wright et al., 2016; 
Twitter, 2016b). The reactive approach only works to fuel the ummah consciousness. Due 
to the relatively high geodesic distances found within networks of pro-IS females, Twitter 
must proactively target key accounts, such as females with high nBetweenness Scores, in 
order to effectively dismantle these networks. Further, in part due to the low level of tie 
strength, a more effective approach would be for officials to target bridge accounts and 
eliminate the networks’ primary information brokers. Twitter can achieve this result 
through several different ways. For example, data scientists can help build out Twitter’s 
spam-detecting algorithms to identify specific female pro-jihadist supporters, and act 
accordingly.42 Alternatively, as Hoyle et al (2015) suggest, targeted advertising of 
counter-narratives can be used online to discourage females from radicalizing. Twitter 
                                                 
42 Twitter (2016, N.p.) notes, “there is no one ‘magic algorithm’ for identifying terrorist 
content on the Internet.” 
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could use their spam algorithm to tailor home pages of potentially vulnerable females to 
stop them from following or messaging other radicalized females. It bears repeating that 
these efforts must be informed and ethical so they do not violate an individual’s freedom 
to express themselves. In the same fashion as the implications for public safety officials, 
Twitter must take an educated approach to takedowns, ensuring that their suspensions are 
not purely based around labelling someone as a threat because of their social positioning. 
Rather, Twitter must account for the tweets posted when considering suspending a user, 
to ensure that they are in fact tweeting radical propaganda which can radicalize others.  
The final recommendation is for public safety officials, social media 
organizations, and researchers alike. This study has shown that SNA can be used 
effectively to explore online pro-jihadist terrorist networks. These individuals should 
continue to examine the topics of gender, radicalization, and social media, using SNA so 
that scholarly work can inform policies and practices. To illustrate, scholars can help 
identify key indicators of radicalization for females, such as networks that include pro-
jihadist females with low tie strength, to help Twitter—and potentially other social media 
sites—account for this in their spam-detecting algorithms. Similarly, public safety 
organizations can use this information to identify individuals that need to be de-
radicalized; they can use this data to find these hard-to-reach individuals and direct 
informed offline investigations.   
5.5 Limitations & Future Studies 
There are several limitations to this study related to sampling design and data 
collection, which may have skewed the results of this study (see Section 3.4 for 
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limitations specific to the SNA method). Further, these limitations restrict the 
implications in this thesis, as the results cannot be generalized.   
To start, the sample for this study was collected using snowball sampling during a 
relatively short period of time, so the results only pertain to a small amount of female 
pro-IS supporters who were active on August 9th, 2016. Future studies may examine 
alternative methods of data collection which could allow for stronger inferences. For 
example, a researcher can perform a longitudinal study in order to examine how the 
influence of females within the pro-IS network changes over time or in response to a 
particular event. 
This study was also limited by the available data on gender and group support on 
Twitter, as there was no way to confirm whether a tweet had actually been generated by a 
single female account holder. Potentially multiple individuals or males posing as females 
could use fake female accounts to tweet propaganda. This issue is particularly relevant to 
supporters of ISIS, as the organization’s mobile application, The Dawn of Glad Tidings, 
can post automatically for its subscribers (J. Berger & Morgan, 2015; Farwell, 2014; 
Glavin, 2015).  It was also difficult to verify whether a user in the sample actually 
supported IS offline. For example, Huey and Kalyal (2015) explain that, in some 
instances, other researchers or public safety officials might be active on Twitter, posing 
as extremist supporters. Moving forward, researchers may turn to using sentiment 
analysis to detect patterns in tweets and parse out whether or not they are unique to the 
account holders, and make more informed decisions on coding group support (see 
Ghajar-Khosravi, Kwantes, Derbentseva & Huey, 2016). In turn, this method would help 
strengthen sample representativeness of the female pro-IS population on Twitter. 
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Language barriers also proved to be a limitation for this thesis during the coding 
process. Individuals who support IS frequently tweeted or retweeted their messages of 
support in Arabic. I am a native English speaker, so I had to rely on Google Translate to 
convert the tweets into English before coding them; however, I had no way of ensuring 
that the translations were accurate. This issue was particularly prevalent when tweeters 
used idioms or slang terms. As a result, I tended to select accounts that used more visual 
displays of support (e.g. posting images of the IS flag) or used English as their primary 
language to ensure I did not include a non-IS supporter in my sample. Researchers who 
continue to examine pro-IS supporters’ activity on Twitter should employ translators or 
trained Arabic linguists in order to ensure they have an accurate understanding of a user’s 
Arabic tweets.43 
A further consideration is expanding the metrics used to analyze female pro-IS 
supporters on Twitter. This study analyzed the sample network using three common SNA 
metrics; however, there are many other metrics that can be employed to explore Twitter 
networks. In subsequent studies, researchers could consider performing more work on the 
micro level to identify specific influential actors and their sub-communities. For example, 
Borgatti (2006) created an algorithm to detect “key players” in networks, which could be 
employed to provide a clearer view of influencers within the network. The information 
gained by using this algorithm could help researchers gain a more accurate understanding 
of key radicalizers within networks. Further, it could be used by investigators to 
                                                 
43 Twitter (2016) has also noted that they have made investments into the language 
capabilities of the platform in order to more accurately detect pro-jihadist users.  
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determine which individuals they must intervene with to prevent the radicalization of 
other women. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study was to explore the network of female pro-IS supporters 
on Twitter using social network analysis. To do so, the study analyzed the 5,861 vertices 
and 12,034 edges based on a sample of twenty accounts. The results of the study showed 
that within the pro-IS female network, female users were more influential and had a 
greater ability to radicalize other females. The study also showed that the social distance 
between accounts in the network was more than three geodesics, indicating that not all 
pro-IS females within the network were influential. Accordingly, researchers, social 
media organizations, and public safety officials must pay close attention to the relatively 
small amount of hyper-influential pro-IS females within networks. Finally, this study also 
identified that the female pro-IS network has a low level of tie strength and, as a result, 
there was a significant opportunity for key influential female ISIS supporters to 
encourage other females to radicalize.  
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Appendix 2. Coding Guide 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
USERNAME 
 
HANDLE 
 
FOLLOWERS 
 
FOLLOWING 
 
NUMBER OF TWEETS 
 
NUMBER OF RETWEETS 
 
 
GENDER CODING INFORMATION 
PROFILE 
-Handle/Account name includes female Kunya or 
Nasab (i.e. Umm or Bint) 
-cover picture/profile picture of female in burqa or 
niqab 
-self-disclose gender in autobiography  
 
 
TWEETS 
-Use female pronouns (i.e. Mujahira) 
-Tweet at other ‘Sisters’ 
 
PICTURES 
-Post pictures of themselves or other females 
 
 
 
 
PRO-IS CODING INFORMATION 
PROFILE 
-Handle/Account name includes pro-IS term (i.e. 
Baqiyah, Greenbird) 
-IS mentioned in autobiography 
-cover picture/profile picture of IS image (i.e. 
Tawheed) 
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TWEETS 
-discuss ISIS-related content 
-Use ISIS hashtags (i.e. #IS, #ISIS) 
 
 
 
PICTURES 
-Propaganda (i.e. Meme’s, pictures of IS 
controlled sites) 
-Screenshots of propaganda videos 
 
 
RETWEETS/FAVOURITES 
-supporting individuals from ISIS accounts 
(official news accounts, disseminators or fighters) 
- Baqiyah shout outs 
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Appendix 3. Sample Profile Pictures 
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Appendix 4. Sample Tweets 
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Appendix 5. Sample Autobiographies 
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Appendix 6. Research Ethics Board Approval 
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Appendix 7. Sample Hub and Spoke  
 
Appendix 8. Sample Bridge 
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